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This paper provides field evidence on (a) how price framing affects consumers’ decision to 
switch health insurance plans and (b) how the price elasticity of demand for health insurance 
can be influenced by policymakers through simple regulatory efforts. In 2009, in order to 
foster competition among health insurance companies, German federal regulation required 
health insurance companies to express price differences between health plans in absolute 
Euro values rather than percentage point payroll tax differences. Using individual-level panel 
data, as well as aggregated health plan-level panel data, we find that the reform led to a 
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Price competition is central to the idea of managed competition. Under managed competi-
tion, consumers should be provided with standardized beneﬁt packages as well as transpar-
ent and extensive information about quality of care, along with an array of different health
plans to choose from. In theory, health insurances would then face incentives to improve
the quality of care, cut costs and, thus, compete solely on the basis of health care quality
and prices. A necessary condition for this model to work in practice is cost-consciousness
among consumers and a sufﬁciently large price elasticity of demand for health plan choices.
In other words, switching costs across health plans need to be sufﬁciently low and price
sensitivity among consumers sufﬁciently large.
The question of how to design health insurance markets that foster price competition
among insurances is a critical piece of the puzzle in ﬁguring out how to curb health expen-
diture growth while improving quality of care. For any type of market-based health insur-
ance reform, price competition among insurances and price sensitivity among consumers
are both crucial.
The key feature of this article is to show that price framing has a substantial impact on
price competition and price sensitivity in the health care market. We exploit a natural exper-
iment that exogenously changed the framing of health plan prices in Germany. By means
of laboratory experiments, various studies show that the framing of decisions matters (cf.
Tversky and Kahnemann (1981)). Few studies do so using real-world settings (cf. DellaV-
igna (2009)). Chetty et al. (2009) demonstrate in a ﬁeld experiment that price framing of
commodity taxes affects demand. Wallace and Huck (2010) provide a comprehensive lit-
erature review on the impact of price frames on consumer decision making and conclude
that there is limited evidence on some sort of price framing. After summarizing the “patchy
evidence” that comes from experimental research and consumer surveys, Wallace and Huck
(2010) implement ﬁve pricing strategies in a coherent experimental setting in order to study
consumer decision making. Bertini and Wathieu (2006) also offer a concise introduction of
how the framing of prices affects the perceived value of goods. The study that is closest in
spirit to ours is Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton (2008). In an experiment conducted in Mexico,
they use a sample of ﬁnancially illiterate to show that presenting fees in pesos instead of
annual percentage rates induces changes in choice behavior in a hypothetical investment
setting. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study in a real world setting that shows how
consumer behavior in the health care market is causally affected by price framing. Hence,
this paper contributes to the growing, but still scant, literature on behavioral economics and
health care (cf. Frank (2004); Liebman and Zeckhauser (2008)).
Given its enormous relevance, it is not surprising that the empirical (health) economics
literature on price competition and consumer price sensitivity of health plan choice is large.
The great majority of the existing evidence comes from the United States. In terms of health
1care spending, the US health care market is the most important one in the world. At the
same time, it is among the most fragmented and, presumably, least regulated systems in
the industrialized world. The majority of the US population is enrolled in a health care plan
that is offered by one of the more than 1,200 private health insurance companies. Even when
insurance coverage is predominately funded through taxes, enrollees are often covered by
private health insurance plans. In total, thousands of different health plans exist, each offer-
ing a different beneﬁt package and a different combination of deductibles, copayments, and
stop-loss limits. Moreover, health insurance companies negotiate provider reimbursement
rates separately and, hence, the quality of care differs widely across plans and settings. To
a large extent, quality of care is not observable by consumers. This information asymmetry
makes health plan quality an experience good and results in health plan choice persistence
and “status quo bias”–factors that lower consumer price sensitivity.
Two additional distinct features of the US health care system presumably lower premium
elasticities: limited choice of plans and higher switching costs due to provider network
changes induced by switching. More than 50 percent of all working age Americans obtain
health insurance coverage through their employers (National Center for Health Statistics,
2011). In the ﬁrst stage, employers select health plans and offer them to their employees. In
a second stage, employees choose health plans. Although health plan choice has increased
over time, more than 80 percent of all ﬁrms that offer health insurance only offer one type of
plan—the great majority of employees can only choose from a menu of managed care plans
(The Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011). Managed care plans, however, restrict provider ac-
cess to a predetermined provider network. This means that health plan switching often
entails provider switching, which boosts health plan switching costs. Cebul et al. (2011) ﬁnd
that, in the US health insurance market, search frictions are substantial and increase insur-
ance premiums. These issues do not exist in Germany. Plan switching comes with much
lower costs since there are no provider networks in Germany and choice of hospitals and
doctors does not depend on the health insurance provider. Moreover, there is no employer
health insurance and insurance companies offer a substantially homogenous product.
Principally due to data limitations, the great majority of research on the effect of price
changes on switching behavior focuses on the US employer group market, makes use of
ﬁrm data from a single employer, and identiﬁes elasticity estimates based on within em-
ployer premium variation (see Section 2 or Gaynor and Town (2011) for a comprehensive
overview). Given the lack of comprehensive consistent data, the “reduced form literature”
on this topic is relatively sparse. On the other hand, a rich literature that models whole
health insurance markets structurally has emerged (see Section 2). However, the struc-
tural strand of the literature mainly focuses on modeling welfare implications of adverse
selection. As a “by-product”, these studies often also provide demand elasticity estimates
of health plan choice. In summary, it comes as no surprise that elasticity estimates vary
tremendously and that reviewing literature ﬁnds no consensus on this point.
2This paper advances the literature on price competition, price framing, and consumer
price sensitivity in the health care market in several respects. We study the German health
insurance market, which has distinct features that allow us to shut down multiple channels
that might have potentially confounded previous estimates: Germany has a universal health
insurance system. 90 percent of the population is insured under a public health insurance
system, which is, however, not a single payer system. More than 150 health insurance com-
panies (“sickness funds”) compete against each other and are regulated by German Social
law. Beneﬁt packages are highly standardized and basically do not differ across sickness
funds. Cost-sharing is almost not existent; the modest copayment rates are heavily regu-
lated and are identical across health plans. By international standards, there are no barriers
in access to care. Choice of providers is free and not restricted. Reimbursement rates in the
inpatient and outpatient sector are centrally determined and not by negotiations between
single insurance companies and providers. Guaranteed issue exists and insurance premi-
ums are income-dependent in form of contribution rates. Consequently it is fair to say that
150 sickness funds offer 150 almost identical health plans and only compete on the basis of
price.
We make use of this unique institutional setting, long-running individual-level panel
data, and aggregated health plan-level panel data to study the effects of a unique natural
experiment: At the beginning of 2009, the German legislature implemented a reform that
exogenously changed the price framing of premium differentials between sickness funds.
Before the reform, prices for health insurance plans were expressed in percentage points of
the gross wage and paid through payroll deductions. To foster price competition between
insurers, the reform equalized and froze the contribution rates deducted from the payroll
for all health plans and forced sickness funds to express price deviations in absolute Euro
values.
We exploit price variation across sickness funds over a time span of more than ten years
to show that changing the price framing from relative to absolute terms substantially in-
creased consumer switching probabilities and price competition in the market. Under the
old regime, price differentials were expressed in relative terms with respect to the gross
wageanddeductedfromthepayroll. Pre-reform, weestimatethatanincreaseofthemonthly
premiumby10Eurosincreasedtheindividual-levelprobabilitytoswitchtoanothersickness
fund by 0.9 percentage points or 16 percent, given a baseline yearly switching probability
of 5.6 percent. Changing the incremental price framing to absolute Euro values doubled the
baseline probability that an individual would switch health insurance plans to more than
11 percent. The price elasticity of switching health plans—expressing the change in percent
that a consumer will switch health plans after a price increase by 1 percent—increased by
the factor 6 from 2.5 to 14. Aggregated panel data from ﬁve of the largest German sickness
funds conﬁrms this ﬁnding. This study also conﬁrms earlier ﬁndings and shows that price
sensitivity varies across customer characteristics: the young, the mentally strong, the non-
3smokers and non-obese are more price sensitive than the rest of the population. Moreover,
risk averse individuals are less price sensitive.
The next section reviews the health economics literature on price elasticities and switch-
ing behaviors. Section 3 outlines the institutional details of the German health care market.
Section 4 is the main empirical section and provides information on the individual-level
panel dataset that we use. Section 5 provides complementary evidence from aggregated
health plan level data. Section 4 concludes.
2 Previous Literature on Health Plan Switching
As previously noted, the large majority of the literature on health plan choices and premium
elasticities studies the US employer group market. First, we brieﬂy survey the structural es-
timation literature on this topic. It models whole (health) insurance markets and provides
some premium elasticity estimates of health plan choices. However, premium elasticities are
not the focus of this literature since it is mainly concerned with the welfare implications of
adverse selection. Einav et al. (2010) study how inefﬁcient pricing in insurance markets with
selection results in welfare loss. They use individual level data from a US employer in 2004
and variation in health plan premiums to estimate the demand for insurance. The authors
ﬁnd that an annual price increase of $100 decreases the probablity that a given health plan
is selected by 11 percent. Handel (2011), using data from from a large US employer between
2004 and 2009, estimates a structural choice model that incorporates switching costs. He
ﬁnds low demand elasticity estimates. Lustig (2011) combines data from multiple sources
to structurally model the Medicare+Choice market (Medicare Part C) under adverse selec-
tion and imperfect competition. He ﬁnds that a monthly price increase of $10 reduces the
market share of a plan by 6.4 percent. Starc (2011) uses administrative market level data to
model the Medigap market. She ﬁnds that elasticities are correlated with claims and that
an annual premium increase of $100 leads to a decrease in the market share of a plan by 7.5
percent. Using data from an intermediary covering 11 small to mid-sized employers for the
years 2004-2005, Bundorf et al. (2008) calculate that a $100 increase in the annual enrollee
contribution results in health plan market share losses of between 7 to 9 percent.
Note that the estimates from all these studies refer to market share changes in response to
absolute premium price changes faced by the individual (“out-of-pocket semi-elasticities”).
However, in case of employer-sponsored health insurance, employees usually pay only a
share of the total premium. The share paid by the employee varies by plan type and ﬁrm
characteristics and ranges from 0 percent to more than 50 percent (The Kaiser Family Foun-
dation, 2011). Remember that, in the ﬁrst stage, employers pre-select the choice of health
plans offered to employees—a choice that is likely to depend on price variation in the en-
tire premium. It is also noteworthy that these studies report the premium elasticities with
4respect to changes in market shares. Market shares in the US employer setting, however,
are typically deﬁned as within-ﬁrm market shares. Also note that baseline employee contri-
butions and market-shares differ across settings, which hampers the comparability of these
estimates. Moreover, the within-ﬁrm choice set only reﬂects a very restricted choice set de-
termined by the employer and neglects that employees have the option to buy insurance
coverage on the individual market. Despite tax subsidies for employer-sponsored health in-
surance, this might be an attractive option for young healthy employees who would need to
pay a high share of the premium out-of-pocket or who work in an industry with high group
rates.
We now survey selected studies in the reduced form strand of the literature. While older
studies were limited to cross-sectional analyses, Dowd and Feldman (1994) use health plan
level panel data from ﬁve employers in Minneapolis and estimate that a $7 out-of-pocket
monthly price increase decreases a plan’s market share by 0.112 percentage points (demand
elasticity: -7.9). Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997) study the switching behavior of 75,000
University of California (UC) employees after a change UC’s contribution policy. In re-
sponse to a $10 increase in employee premiums (starting from zero), the individual-level
baseline switching probability increased by the factor ﬁve to 25 percent. Cutler and Re-
ber (1998) use a sample of Harvard employees to estimate demand elasticities of -0.3 and
-0.6, i.e., they ﬁnd that plan enrollment decreased by between 0.3 and 0.6 percent in a re-
sponse to a 1 percent increase in plan prices paid by Harvard employees (“out-of-pocket
premium elasticity”). Royalty and Solomon (1999) use Stanford employees and distinguish
between “insurer-perspective” elasticities, which refers to changes in total premium prices,
and “employee-perspective” elasticities, which refer to changes in “out-of-pocket” premium
changes. The probability that employees chose a speciﬁc health plan decreased by 0.5 to 0.8
percent for every 1 percent increase in employees’ plan price. Taking into account that em-
ployers contribute a substantial share of the premium substantially inﬂates elasticities to -1
up to -3.5 (“insurer-perspective elasticity”). In another study using UC employees, Strom-
bom et al. (2002) calculate “insurer perspective own-price elasticities” of health plans and
ﬁnd that a monthly premium increase of $5 decreases the plans market share by between
1.2 and 3.7 percent. Atherly et al. (2004) study the Medicare+Choice market and calcu-
late out-of pocket premium elasticities of -0.134 and insurer perspective elasticities of -4.6.
Buchmueller (2006) focus on a sample of retirees 60 and calculates out-of-pocket premium
elasticities of between -0.2 and -0.3, implying that a health plan would loose 4 to 8 percent of
its enrollees it if increases monthly contributions by $10. Using 2002-2005 data from an US
employer and a Baysian approach, Carlin and Town (2009) estimate various “plan-speciﬁc”
and “cross-plan premium elasticities” ranging from -0.01 to -0.41, meaning that a 1 percent
price increase results in a market share decrease between 0.01 and 0.4 percent. Chan and
Gruber(2010b)studyplanchoicepricesensitivityamonglow-incomeemployeesintheMas-
sachusetts’ Commonwealth Care program. A $10 out-of-pocket premium increase reduces
5the probability that a health plan is chosen by 8 to 16 percent resulting in an out-of pocket
premium elasticities of -0.7. In Chan and Gruber (2010a), the authors study heterogeneity in
price sensitivity in more detail.
Instead of switching plans as a response to premium changes, employees in the US mar-
ket may decide to drop or take-up (employer-sponsored) coverage. Cutler and Reber (1998)
ﬁnd that the probability of dropping coverage increased by 1 percent for every out-of-pocket
premium increase by 1 percent, i.e., an coverage elasticity of -1. The “out-of-pocket premium
take-up elasticities” found in the literature are consistently estimated to be very low. The
elasticities range between -0.014 and -0.09, implying that a decrease in employees’ out-of-
pocket premium contribution by 10 percent increases take-up rates by between 0.14 and 0.9
percent (Chernew et al., 1997; Blumberg Linda J., 2002; Cutler and Garber, 2003; Gruber and
Washington, 2005; Jacobs, 2009).
The non-US literature on premium elasticities and consumer switching behavior is ex-
tremely sparse. Using data from all sickness funds in the Netherlands, Schut and Hassink
(2002) study the effects of a managed competition-based health insurance reform and ﬁnd
out-of-pocket premium elasticities with respect to the market share of -0.3 for compulsory
insurance. Discussing differences to the US market comprehensively, the authors conclude
that price sensitivity in the US would be much higher due to lower search costs and higher
switching experience. Subsequent studies conﬁrm these low elasticity estimates for the
Netherlands (Schut et al., 2003; Dijk et al., 2008). Using aggregated administrative data,
Schut et al. (2003) study how price elasticity changed after the introduction of free sickness
fund choice in Germany in 1996. They estimate that the market share elasticity of a one
percentage point increase in the income-dependent contribution rates increased over time
to -4.8 in 1999/2000. Using an unbalanced panel of all German sickness funds between Jan-
uary 2001 and April 2004, Tamm et al. (2007) estimate the short-run premium elasticity to
be about -1, i.e., an increase in the contribution rate by 1 percentage points would lower
the market share by 1 percent. Using the same dataset as this study, the SOEP, Andersen
and Schwarze (1998, 1999) as well as Andersen et al. (2002, 2007) estimate the determinants
of switching behavior and analyze socio-economic characteristics of switchers. Schwarze
and Andersen (2001) estimate that the individual-level probability to switch health plans
increases from 5 to 9 percent if average contribution rates increase by 1 percent. Nuscheler
and Knaus (2005) also take advantage of the SOEP to study adverse selection in the Ger-
man health insurance market. They ﬁnd that good health increases the probability to switch
funds signiﬁcantly and discuss implications for the German risk equalization scheme.
In addition to the literature that focuses on price effects, some US studies measure the
impact of quality information on switching behavior (Beaulieu, 2002; Abraham et al., 2006).
The market for Medicare Part D also draws some attention. Abaluck and Gruber (2011)
document that the elderlies’ health plan choices are not consistent with optimization under
full information. Other studies came to similar conclusions (Heiss et al., 2006, 2007, 2009).
6There is also a consensus in the literature that the young and healthy are more price sensitive
than the old and sick. This ﬁnding is in line with the phenomenon of status-quo bias, i.e.,
the observation that the price sensitivity depends on the enrollment length in a health plan
due to loss aversion (cf. Royalty and Solomon (1999); Strombom et al. (2002); Nuscheler and
Knaus (2005); Becker and Zweifel (2008); Dijk et al. (2008)).
Insurance search and switching behavior is also studied in search models (cf. Bolhaar
et al. (2009)). Frank and Lamiraud (2009) and Ortiz (2011) do not use search models but
study switching behavior in a health care market that is similar to the German one: In
Switzerland, homogenoushealthplans—albeitlessgenerousthaninGermany—mainlycom-
pete on a price basis under universal coverage. Still switching rates are, as in Germany, low.
Frank and Lamiraud (2009) provide evidence that an increase in the number of choices re-
duces the individuals’ willingness to switch health plans, even if price dispersion is persis-
tent and substantial. On average, Swiss residents can choose from 50 different health plans.
About 20 percent switched their health plans from 2009 to 2010. According to laboratory
evidence, an increase in health plan choice increases participants’ decision making time and
decreases the quality of their choice (Schram and Sonnemans, 2011).
3 Institutional background
3.1 The German Health Insurance System
TheGermanhealth insurance systemisactuallycomprisedof twoindependenthealthinsur-
ance systems that exist side by side: a public one and a private one. Germany has universal
health care coverage and uninsured individuals practically do not exist. This paper focuses
on Public Health Insurance (PHI), which covers about 90 percent of the German population.
Employees whose gross income from salary is below a deﬁned income threshold (in 2011:
e49,500 per year) are compulsorily insured under PHI. Non-working spouses and depen-
dent children are covered at no cost by PHI family insurance. Special regulations apply to
speciﬁc groups, like students and the unemployed with most PHI-insured.
High-income earners who exceed the income threshold, as well as self-employed indi-
viduals, have the right to choose between PHI and private health insurance. Once an op-
tionally insured person (a high-income earner, self-employed person, or civil servant) opts
out of the PHI system, it is practically impossible to switch back to PHI. Hence, opting out
of the public scheme can be seen as a lifetime decision.
Everyone covered under PHI is subject to a generous universal beneﬁt package, which is
determined at the federal level and codiﬁed in the Social Code Book V (Sozialgesetzbuch V,
SGB V). Coinsurance rates are prohibited in PHI and thus, apart from copayments which are
7ﬁxed at the federal level, health services are fully covered. PHI is one pillar of the German
social security system (German Ministry of Health, 2011).
The compulsorily insured cannot choose their degree of coverage. Moreover, the beneﬁt
packages are determined at the federal level and are, therefore, almost the same among
all insurance companies. Nevertheless, employees can choose between about 150 different
health insurances, called “sickness funds.” Each sickness fund offers one standard health
plan, which is why, henceforth, we use the terms “health insurance,” “sickness fund,” and
“health plan” as interchangeably.
The 150 sickness funds mainly compete on pricing. For compulsorily insured mem-
bers, since cost-sharing is ﬁxed at the federal level, price competition works through dif-
ferences in monthly sickness fund premiums. In PHI, premiums are not risk-related and
only depend on income. Sickness funds are not-for-proﬁt organizations meaning that, in the
medium-run, revenues must equal expenses. There exists guaranteed issue and free choice
of providers. Reimbursement of providers is also determined centrally and does not vary
across sickness funds.
3.2 Characterization of the Industry, Premiums, and Price Framing
The roots of this social insurance system go back to Otto von Bismarck. Under his lead-
ership, Germany was the ﬁrst country in the world that implemented a mandatory health
insurance system for some population subgroups in 1883.1 Traditionally, employees were
allocated to sickness funds—based on their occupation or industry—and had no right to
switch funds.
In 1996, switching sickness funds became a legal right. To avoid cream-skimming on the
insurer side, a risk equalization scheme was implemented in 1994. At the beginning it was
only based on the factors age, gender, and disability status, but was developed further in
the years since. Funds with an insurance pool of good risks must contribute to a risk equal-
ization fund that pays out money to sickness funds with pools of bad risks. As of 2011, the
risk equalization scheme also equalizes differences in the risk pool according to 80 different
diagnoses. To sum up, in Germany, as compared to international standards, selection issues
and cream-skimming are a minor problem as the precision of the risk equalization scheme
is increasing.
Given that health plan coverage, cost-sharing, access to care, and quality of care do
not differ across health plans, policymakers had high hopes that competition among plans
would intensify after switching became a legal right. It did, as the large decrease in the num-
ber of sickness funds demonstrates. In 1995, there were 916 funds. In 2011 the number had
dropped to 150 The number was exclusively reduced through mergers, primarily between
smaller funds. However, despite substantial price dispersion in a market with homogenous
1Gesetz betreffend die Krankenversicherung der Arbeiter (KGV), passed May 29, 1883.
8health plans, switching rates remained fairly low and did not increase over time. According
to our dataset, in 1999, only 7 percent of all respondents switched health plans. In 2007, the
ﬁgure was only 4.5 percent.
3.2.1 Calculation and Price Framing of Premiums: Pre-Reform
PHI is primarily ﬁnanced by mandatory payroll deductions that are not risk-related but
income-dependent. Forpeoplewithgainfulemployment, thesecontributionsaresplitequally
between employer and employee up to a contribution ceiling (2011: e44,550 per year).
The health policy reform that we evaluate in this paper became effective January 1, 2009.
Prior to that reform, sickness fund premiums (“contributions”) were solely expressed as
a share of the gross wage. This mandatory payroll tax was automatically deducted from
employees’ paychecks. For example, the average contribution rate in 2002 amounted to 14
percent of the gross wage and was (by law) equally split between employers and employees
(German Ministry of Health, 2011). The average gross wage in that year was e2,386 (Ger-
man Social Code Book VI, Annex I). This means that, on average, 0.07e2,386=e167 per
month were deducted directly from employees’ paychecks and transferred by the employer
to the sickness fund chosen by the employee. In addition, the employer contributed the
same amount.2.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Before 2009, each sickness fund directly and independently collected employees’ and em-
ployers’ contributions and was allowed to set the insurance premium, i.e., the contribution
rate as a share of an employee’s gross wage. In 2008, contribution rates varied between 12.7
and 17.4 percent of the gross wage (see column (1) of Table 1). Applied to the average gross
wage in that year, column (2) of Table 1 demonstrates that the average employees could
have saved up to e60 per month by switching from the most expensive to the least expen-
sive health plan. As column (5) shows, not all of the plans in the upper and lower tail of the
premium distribution operated nationally. Even if one only takes nationally available plans
into account, the average employee could still have saved up to e40 by switching. Table 1
also illustrates the market concentration process. By the end of 2011, half of the ten sickness
funds displayed had merged with other sickness funds.
Before 2009, when an employee wanted to switch their health plan, they had to give
cancelation notice in written form. The cancelation period was two months from the end
of the month in which cancelation notice was given. The minimum contract period was
2Effective July 1, 2005, the strict equal sharing of contributions was altered. After that date, the employee’s
share was increased slightly and they are now charged [0.9 + 0.5  (cr   0.9)] percent of their gross wage;
where cr denotes the overall contribution rate. In the example above, this would amount to an employee
share of 7.45 percent and an employer share of 6.55 percent of the gross wage (cf. Gesetz zur Anpassung der
Finanzierung von Zahnersatz from December 15, 2004)
918 months. However, if sickness funds planned to increase contribution rates, they were
required to give notice to their insurees in written form at least one month in advance. Inde-
pendent of the enrollment length, sickness fund members then had an extraordinary right
to cancel the contract and switch funds within two months.
3.2.2 Explanations for Large Price Differences Across Homogenous Health Plans: Pre-
Reform
Table 1 reveals wide price differences between sickness funds in 2008. In a market with
very similar products, this phenomenon needs explanation. The most important reason
goes back to historical legacy. As mentioned above, before 1996, switching sickness funds
was not possible in Germany. Hence, some 1,500 funds with very different risk pools ex-
isted. A large number of funds consisted of employees from a single company. Depending
on the industry and occupation this resulted in a good or bad risk pool of the insurance
companies. Moreover, the insured had different incomes. Think of a bank with many well
educated high earner employees who formed the bank’s sickness fund members. Likewise,
other funds with, say, minors, had a much worse risk pool and income situation. Since con-
tributions were income related, a higher average income resulted, ceteris paribus, in a lower
contribution rate to ﬁnance the same health care expenses of the insured.
Until 1996, contribution rates varied widely. In order to allow a fair competition between
sickness funds and to protect sickness funds with high contribution rates due to a bad risk
pool, a risk equalization scheme was introduced along with the freedom to choose a sickness
fund. Switching health insurance companies remained a fairly rare event after the introduc-
tion of the free sickness fund choice. Therefore, historical price differences remained.
Cebul et al. (2011) show that the law of one price does not hold in frictional insurance
markets. Besides frictions, “status quo bias” could be another mechanism explaining low
switching rates. Tversky and Kahnemann (1981)’s theory of loss aversion suggests that hu-
mans have a tendency to exaggerate the disadvantages of exiting the current state, while
understating the potential gains of an alternative state. This might especially be true when
it comes to such an important issue like one’s own health. A third explanation for low
switching rates would be brand loyalty. Brand loyalty is a common phenomenon in other
product markets.
The main objective of this paper is to analyze yet another explanation for the low switch-
ing rates—one that also policymakers had in mind when they implemented the reform that
we study in this paper: price framing. As explained above, before 2009 price differences
across plans were expressed as relative percentage point contribution rate differences. To
calculate the exact insurance premium that an employee had to pay, they needed to know (i)
their exact monthly gross wage; (ii) information about the current contribution ceiling; (iii)
the exact contribution rate that her insurer charged; and (iv) how the employee’s share of the
10total contribution rate was calculated. On the other hand, (online) calculators to compare
price differences were widely known and available.
Apart from historical reasons, two further reasons might have also led to contribution
rate differences observed in the market. The ﬁrst are differences in efﬁciency of the sick-
ness funds, meaning differences in administrative costs. In terms of intra-company process
efﬁciency, larger health insurers certainly have advantages over smaller ones, are able to ex-
ploit economies of scale, and thus can operate more efﬁciently. This is the main driving force
behind the mergers of small funds. The density of the branch network of the insurance com-
pany affects health plan price differences to certain amount. The less expensive health plans,
by contrast, minimize their administrative costs by operating largely on an online internet
basis or through call centers. Administrative costs amount to only 5 percent of sickness fund
expenditures, but vary among funds and might lead to differences in prices.
Second, to differentiate their product, health plans can offer some additional beneﬁts.
Since the standard (and mandatory) beneﬁt package is already very generous, these addi-
tional beneﬁts are very limited and comprised of few health care services such as immu-
nizations for tropical diseases or speciﬁc prevention screenings. These extra beneﬁts only
make up 5 percent of the beneﬁt package, while 95 percent are ﬁxed. Like administrative
costs, these differences result only in very small expenditure differences between funds but
may also lead to variations in prices. Most importantly, the adding of small extra beneﬁts to
differentiate the product did not change due to the reform. Hence, it should not be a threat
to our estimates. If anything, more expensive health plans might have stressed the existence
of extra beneﬁts after the reform even more. For this case, we would underestimate the pure
framing effect.
3.2.3 Calculation and Price Framing of Premiums: Post-Reform
In 2007, the German legislature implemented a law to foster competition among sickness
funds in the German PHI System. The core idea was to change the price framing in the PHI
system. Policymakers wanted to emphasize and visualize price differences across funds
more clearly and accurately in order to encourage sickness fund switching and, hence, com-
petition among funds.
Effective January 2009, a new law equalized and froze the contribution rates to 15.5 per-
cent for all funds. By law, sickness funds are now forced to charge an “add-on premium”
in form of an absolute monthly Euro amount in case that expenses cannot be covered by
the revenues generated from the ﬁxed and equalized contribution rate. On the other hand,
well managed and ﬁnancially sound sickness funds can directly reimburse their members
a monthly Euro amount. In other words: the law requires sickness funds to express price
differences not in relative terms with respect to employees’ gross wages, but instead in ab-
solute Euro values. Moreover, sickness funds now have to bill (or reimburse) such add-on
11premiums separately, while the 15.5 percent general contribution is still deducted from the
payroll. Table 2 gives an overview of all sickness funds that charged add-on premiums or
reimbursed premiums since 2009. Column (2) indicates the date of introduction and column
(3) the abolishment in the event that the funds changed their policy in the meantime.
At the beginning sickness funds were reluctant to charge add-on premiums. Having
no experience with such a change in price framing, no one wanted to be the ﬁrst mover to
charge an add-on premium. The ﬁrst sickness fund to charge an add-on premium was the
Joint BKK Cologne, a small sickness fund with just 30,000 enrollees and a market share of
only 0.04 percent. It charged a premium of e8 per month. Twelve sickness funds followed
in 2010, among them two of the largest German funds: the third largest sickness fund at that
time, the Deutsche Angestellten Krankenkasse (DAK), with 6 million insured people and a
nationwide health plan market share of 8.6 percent, and the Kaufm¨ annische Krankenkasse
(KKH) with 1.9 million insured people and a market share of 2.7 percent. In 2011, four more
sickness funds followed, charging add-on premiums to their members.
As seen in column (1) of Table 2, add-on premiums range between e6.50 and e15 per
month. The majority of funds charge e8, i.e., e96 per year.3
[Insert Table 2 about here]
As of December 2011, 10.5 million Germans are enrolled in health plans that charge an add-
on premium. This represents 15 percent of all PHI insured.4 DAK and KKH enrollees alone
account for 75 percent of the total number. As explained in more detail in the next section,
the main identifying variation in our individual-level dataset comes from employees en-
rolled in sickness funds that are noted in bold in Table 2. They account for 95 percent of all
enrollees who were enrolled in health plans with an add-on premium 2010. In other words:
out the total of 17 health plans that have ever charged an add-on premium, since allowed to
do so under the new law, six health plans account for about 95 percent of all enrollees. We
can identify them in our micro-data.
3Most sickness funds charge e8 per month for the following reason. Until 2011, funds were only allowed
to charge add-on premiums up to a maximum of 1 percent of the gross labor income of each insured. This rule
was meant to protect low income earners from an excessive premium burden. In theory, funds were obliged
to check each insured’s income to make sure that the 1 percent cap was not exceeded. To avoid this huge
administrative effort, policymakers allowed to charge premiums up to e8 per month without the need of an
income-test. This policy was slightly altered in 2011 to allow the possibility of charging unlimited amounts of
add-on premiums and a transfer payment from the government to low income earners. However, this change
is beyond the scope of this paper since we only use data up to and including the year 2010.
4To be precise, we need to distinguish between sickness fund “members”, i.e., those who are charged the
premium and who make the decision whether to switch a fund or not, and “enrollees.” The latter refers to
the total number of insured people and also includes insured family members. The ﬁgures above and in Table
1 and 2 refer to the total number of enrollees. In 2011, the DAK had 4.5 million members (market share: 8.8
percent) and the KKH had 1.3 million members (market share: 2.5 percent). Given that the ratio between
members and total enrollees is about 0.75, about 8 million PHI sickness fund member are currently charged an
add-on premium. DAK and KKH members alone make up 65 percent of the total number affected.
12As seen in Panel B of Table 2, seven ﬁnancially very sound sickness funds currently re-
imburse their members between e2.50 (BKK A.T.U.) and e10 (BKK W¨ urth) per month.
However, the average German is unfamiliar with the existence of these seven relatively
small sickness funds, some of which only have a couple of thousand enrollees. All en-
rollees in these seven health plans account for only 0.63 percent of all PHI enrollees. This
demonstrates that reimbursing premiums is quantitatively of no importance. Given that the
underlying trend in premium growth is strictly positive, it will not be of much relevance in
the future either. Most of these small sickness funds that reimburse premiums only operate
locally with few branch ofﬁces, a very basic service infrastructure, and few employees. Only
three out of the seven reimbursing funds operate nationwide
Cancelationperiodsandminimumcontractperiodshavenotbeenchangedbythereform
analyzed here. Sickness funds are required to give notice at least one month before the
introduction or increase of an add-on premium. After such an announcement, independent
of the enrollment length, sickness fund members have an extraordinary right to cancel the
contract and switch funds within two months. Moreover, all individuals are free to choose
almost any of the 150 sickness funds, which are obliged by law to accept them without any
risk assessment, i.e., there is no experience rating but guaranteed issue exists.
4 Evidence from Long-Runnig Individual-Level Panel Data
In this section the empirical analysis is presented. Here, we rely on rich individual-level
panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). The SOEP is a large and
representative household panel dataset that started in 1984 in West Germany and was ex-
tended to include East Germany in June 1990. Since 1984 several refreshment samples and
innovation samples have been drawn. In 2010, more than 11,000 households comprising of
more than 22,000 individuals participated in the survey.
The SOEP core questionnaire includes a wide array of questions on well-being, labor
market activities, and health. Most of these questions are surveyed annually. Some topics,
e.g., health behavior such as smoking or alcohol consumption, are surveyed every other
year. More information on the SOEP can be found in Wagner et al. (2007). For our empirical
analysis, we make use of the waves 1999-2010.5
5The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v2.0 (Nov 2007) for
Stata. PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu). The PanelWhiz generated
DO ﬁle to retrieve the SOEP data, as well as the Panelwhiz Plugins used here are available upon request. Any
data or computational errors in this paper are our own. Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2010) describe PanelWhiz
in detail.
134.1 Sample Selection and Variable Deﬁnitions
4.1.1 Sample Selection
Starting with the 1999 wave, the SOEP asks information about each respondent’s health
insurance status and sickness fund membership. Moreover, individuals indicate whether
or not they changed their sickness fund in the previous year. Out of the total of about
150 sickness funds, we are able to unambiguously assign respondents to 41 of the largest
sickness funds or health plans.6 Together, these sickness funds have a market share of more
than 80 percent and cover about 50 million Germans. Most importantly, as indicated in bold
in Table 2, among these identiﬁable funds are six funds that introduced an add-on premium
after the implementation of the price framing health reform. Among these funds are two
of the largest German sickness funds, DAK and KKH, which together cover more than 6
million people, about 10 percent of all PHI insurees. In total, the six sickness funds that
we can unambiguously identify accumulate a market share of 95 percent relative the total
market share of all funds that charge add-on premiums.
We can also assign respondents to two funds that reimbursed their members. However,
as inferred from Table 2, charging add-on premiums was quantitatively practically irrele-
vant. Currently, all nine reimbursing sickness funds only cover 0.63 percent of all German
PHI enrollees. In our SOEP data, the two identiﬁable reimbursing funds only translate into
about 30 respondents per year.
Our empirical analysis focuses on sickness fund members, not the total of enrollees; the
latter would also include family members insured at no cost under PHI family insurance.
More precisely, we focus on “paying” members since they have to carry premium increases
and make the decision to switch health plans. We deﬁne paying sickness fund members
as all those who are gainfully employed, earn more than e800 gross per month, and pay
the full PHI health insurance premium.7 In addition, we disregard those insured under the
second tier of the German health care system–the private health insurance. We end up with
a sample of 51,291 person-year observations from 11,813 different individuals.
4.1.2 Deﬁnition of Dependent Variable and Explanation of the Analyses in Part A and B
Ourdependentvariableindicateswhetherasicknessfundmemberswitchedtoanothersick-
ness fund between two interviews, which are usually carried out in the ﬁrst ﬁve months of
a year. This binary dependent variable is called Switch and measures whether a respondent
6We cannot assign individuals to very small sickness funds. This is because respondents only state the
major funds in the questionnaire. All small funds are summarized by “other” in the questionnaire.
7This excludes all those insured under PHI family insurance, the unemployed for some of whom social
security pays the health insurance premium, full-time students who just pay an income-independent ﬂat pre-
mium (2011: e76,41 per month) or who are insured under their parents’ family insurance, pensioners as well
as special population groups, such as draft soldiers or low-income earners. Individuals with a wage of less
than e800 per month do not have to pay the full health insurance contribution.
14cancelled her sickness fund membership since the last interview and switched to another
sickness funds in the course of the year. As an example, a value of 1 in the year 2010 im-
plies than the insured switched sickness funds between the interviews in 2009 and 2010.
Appendix A1 shows that 5.6 percent of all person-year observations entail switches, i.e., we
observe 2,982 health plans switches over all years and across all sickness funds.
In total, in this part of the paper, we carry out two different analyses. Part A, as described
in more detail in Section 4.2.1, solely evaluates whether being enrolled in a health plan that
introducedanadd-onpremiumincreasedtheswitchingprobabilityamongtheseenrollees—
relative to before the reform and relative to the change in switching behavior over time
for the unaffected. We distinguish between one group of insurees that was charged add-
on premia after the reform, a second group of insurees that was reimbursed a part of the
standardizedpremiums, andathird(control)groupthatwasneitherchargedadd-onpremia
nor reimbursed money. This model in Part A is a difference-in-differences (DID) analysis.
Part B, as detailed in Section 4.2.2, introduces regressors that represent health plan pre-
mium changes in Euro values. The main objective of this second model is to exploit exoge-
nous price variation across sickness funds and years—post- and pre-reform. The idea is to
compare the impact of price increases on switching behavior—before and after the regula-
tory change in the requirement of how to frame price differences between health plans. We
also calculate pre- and post-reform price responsiveness for speciﬁc subsamples.
4.1.3 Regressors Measuring Pre- and Post-Reform Price Changes in Part A and B
As previously mentioned, in Part A of the empirical analysis, we solely intend to mea-
sure the effect of charging add-on premiums and reimbursing premiums on the post-reform
switching probability. To this end, we deﬁne a variable named AddOn. AddOn is one for
respondents who actually were charged an add-on premium, i.e., for all respondents who
were insured under one of the six add-on premium charging health plans in post-reform
years (see bold health plans in Table 2). Equivalently deﬁned is the dummy Reimb, which
is one for respondents who actually were reimbursed premiums, i.e., for the respondents
who were insured under one of the two reimbursing health plans in post-reform years as
indicated in bold in Table 2.8 However, since only 0.63 percent of the German population is
enrolled in a health plan that reimburses premiums, we cannot obtain meaningful estimates
with the just 30 SOEP respondents in reimbursing plans in post-reform years. Consequently,
we only use Reimb in one single speciﬁcation.
In Part B of the empirical analysis, we measure the exact price effect on switching be-
havior both pre- and post-reform. For this purpose, in a ﬁrst step, we perform extensive
8As Table 2 illustrates, the seven distinct add-on premium charging and reimbursing sickness funds that
are identiﬁable in the SOEP data introduced their policies in different post-reform years and months. Since we
have information about the exact interview date, this generates some additional variation across time, not just
across funds.
15research at the sickness fund level and collect contribution rates on a monthly basis for all
41 sickness funds in our sample between 2000 and 2010. As seen in Table 1, in 2008—the last
pre-reform year—contribution rates varied from 12.7 to 17.4 percent of an individual’s gross
wages.
According to the day of the interview and the sickness fund, in a ﬁrst step, we pre-
cisely assign the individuals their contribution rates. For reasons discussed in more detail in
Section 4.2.2, we focus on the effect of premium increases on switching behavior. More pre-
cisely, we would like to measure the switching effect of potential premium increases. This
means, the potential premium increase assuming that the individual remains enrolled in the
health plan between t0 and t1. For this purpose, in a second step, we take half the total con-
tribution rate in t1, i.e., the employee’s premium share in t1, and multiply it with the gross
wage (in 2009 values) of the individual in t0 up to the contribution ceiling of year t0.9 We ﬁx
labor income to t0 in order to be able to fully ascribe premium increases to contribution rate
increases and not to confuse it with other inﬂuence factors such as a wage raise after a pro-
motion. From 2009, for employees in add-on premium charging or reimbursing funds, we
addtheaccordingadd-onpremiumorsubtracttheaccordingmonthlyreimbursement. Then
we subtract the health plan premium in t0 from the premium in t1. As a result, we obtain the
monthly insurance premium increase in Euros and call this variable PremiumIncreaseEuro.
Dividing this variable by the monthly premium in t0 provides us with the relative increase
PremiumIncreasePercent. We also generate a rougher measure of premium increases, just
a dummy that indicates whether the individual would face a premium increase between t0
and t1 in case of a no-switch. This variable is called PremiumIncreaseDummy.
Forexample, assumewewereinterestedintheyear2006(2010). ThePremiumIncreaseEuro-
regressor for 2006 (2010) would indicate the change in the probability that a respondent
switched health plans between 2005 (2009) and 2006 (2010)—due to a monthly health plan
premium increase of e1, which was triggered by an increase in the health plan contribution
rate (the introduction of an add-on premium).
4.1.4 Other Socio-Economic Covariates
In addition to the variables described above, we make use of a rich set of socio-economic
background variables to correct for observable differences between respondents and to ana-
lyze heterogeneity in switching behavior and reform effects. All variable names and deﬁni-
9We disregard the employers’ share for various reasons. First, we assume that the incidence of the employ-
ers’ share is indeed on the employers and not on the employees. This is not necessarily the case. However,
there is no empirical evidence on the incidence of social insurance contributions in Germany. Moreover, em-
ployees typically believe that they only pay the employee share as health insurance premium. Even if the
full incidence of health insurance premiums was on the employees, they would typically make the decision
to switch health plans based on their share alone. Second, unlike in the US, in Germany, employers do not
preselect insurance plans for employees in any way. Employees are completely free in choosing their health
insurance plan.
16tions, means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum values, as well as the number
of person-year observations for each variable are shown in Appendix A1.
A ﬁrst group of covariates includes demographics. The standard variables such as Age,
Female, Married and Children under 16 are included. A potentially very interesting vari-
able included is Degree risk taking. It measures individual risk attitudes on a scale from 0
to 10; the mean lies around 4.5 in our sample.
A second group of covariates includes educational and labor market characteristics. We
use various binary variables that measure educational status according to the International
Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED). As for labor market activities, we make use
of the dummies Full-time employed and Part-time employed. In addition, we generate a
measure of the logarithm of equalized household income of an individual and adjust it by
the household composition.10 We call this variable Ln Equiv. HH-Income.
A third group of covariates measures health and health care consumption. We collapse
the ﬁve categorial self-assessed health (SAH) measure into two binary variables and call
them SAH excellent [best health category] and SAH good [second best health category].
Degree disability measures whether individuals are ofﬁcially certiﬁed as disabled, and if
yes, to which degree (from 0 to 100 percent). Doctor visits gives us the doctor visits in the
last quarter and Hospital visits the number of hospital stays in the calendar year prior to the
interview.
In addition, we routinely control for common time shocks by employing year dummies.
We also take account of persistent differences in switching behavior across the 16 German
federal states by incorporating state dummies into our models. All variables listed so far
contain 51,291 observations and represent our main set of covariates. We use these covari-
ates throughout our empirical analyses to adjust the sample composition.
We also take advantage of the rich SOEP dataset and use measures that were not sur-
veyed in every year but every other year. Using the information from every other year, we
impute values for the years in which this information was not surveyed.11 This applies to
the following variables that are solely used to characterize health plan switchers and inves-
tigate heterogeneity in reform effects: In addition to the subjective health measure SAH, we
rely on a generic and quasi-objective health measure that has been surveyed every other
year starting in 2002—the continuous SF12 with its two components for physical (pcs) and
mental health (mcs). We also have a measure called Smoker, which measures the current
smoking status of respondents. 37 percent of our sample smokes. Slightly more than 50 per-
cent of our sample is considered overweight and almost 15 percent of the sample are obese
according to conventional BMI cut-offs (Burkhauser and Cawley, 2008).
10Income equalization is carried out by dividing household income by the square-root of all household
members.
11Imputation is carried out by linear interpolation of each individual’s even year values to odd years.
17All time-varying variables described here measure the actual information as indicated by
the respondent at the time of the interview. To make sure that this information is exogenous
to the switching decision, we use it at time t0 together with the dependent variable that
indicates health plan switching between t0 and t1.
4.2 Part A: Assessing the Effect of Being Charged an Add-On Premium
on Switching Behavior
4.2.1 Econometric Model
To asses the impact of being charged an add-on premium on the switching probability, we
estimate the following probit model:
Prob[Switchit = 1] = F(b0 + b1AddOnit + b2AddOnit  postreformt (1)
+ gXit + ft + sfs + eit)
where Switchit indicates whether individual i switched health plans between t   1 and t.
AddOnit indicates the group of respondents whose sickness funds charged an add-on pre-
mium in post-reform years. postreformt indicates the post-reform time period. The vector
Xit includes the set of standard socio-economic control variables as discussed in Section
4.1.4 and displayed in Appendix A1. ft represents a vector of time dummies and sfs nets
out permanent differences across the 16 German federal states. eit represents the error term
and F(.) stands for the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal distribu-
tion. This is a DID model. Consequently, to obtain the effect of the add-on premium on
switching behavior we calculate the “treatment-effect” as shown by Puhani (2011) for probit
models 12
4.2.2 Identiﬁcation of Causal Effects and Results
The identiﬁcation of causal effects in DID models mainly rests upon the assumption of a
common time trend between the group that was affected by the reform and a control group
that was not. This assumption should hold conditional on all available covariates.
Figure 1 plots the unconditional time trend of our dependent variable for Part A of the
empirical analysis. As can be seen, both trends show fairly parallel developments over time.
Moreover, we observe an abrupt jump in the individual switching probabilities for those
12Puhani (2011) shows that the advice of Ai and Norton (2004) to compute the discrete double difference is
not relevant in nonlinear models when the interest lies in the estimation of a treatment effect in a difference-in-
differences model. Throughout the paper, we calculate and display the marginal effects as proposed by Puhani
(2011).
18respondents who were charged add-on premiums in post-reform years, whereas the switch-
ing probabilities for sickness fund members without add-on premiums are stable over time.
This points towards a strong impact of charging add-on premia on health plan switching
behavior.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Anticipation effects or lock-in effects might be a small issue in this setting. As discussed in
Section 3.2, sickness funds who increase health plan premiums have to give notice in written
form at least one months in advance. Then, insurees have an extraordinary right to switch
sickness funds within the next two months. Contract period rules do not apply during this
window. However, as seen in Figure 1, for 2009 and 2008 as compared to 2007, we observe
a decrease in the switching probability among those who were eventually charged an add-
on premium. However, since we have enough long-running micro panel data at hand, we
can simply drop the potentially contaminated years 2008 and 2009 from our analysis (see
below).
It is important to note that only these two pre-reform years are potentially contaminated
by higher consumer uncertainty about future events. In general, uncertainty about future
premium changes did not change over the course of the reform. In general, at the beginning
of each year, there is certainty about price differences in the current year, t0. In the course of
the year, some health plans also announce price changes for t1. Anticipating price changes
more than one year in advance is quite difﬁcult, if not impossible. However, recall that there
there is no ofﬁcial enrollment period, that the legal contract period is 18 months, but that
plan members have a extraordinary right to cancel contracts and switch plans in case of
premium increases. These regulations did not change after the reform.
Ideally, in DID models, individuals in the treatment and control group should be as sim-
ilar as possible. Parametric models use the covariate distribution of the unaffected group to
make out-of-sample predictions. Appendix A2 show the covariate means for the two groups
separately and evaluates their difference by means of the scale-free normalized difference
(Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). The means of almost all covariates are very similar and al-
most all normalized differences are below 0.1. No value exceeds the sensitivity threshold of
0.25 as proposed by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). Hence, we conclude that the covariate
distribution seems to be well balanced across the two groups and is thus unlikely to lead to
sensitive results. In other words: those employees who were covered under a health plan
that charged an add-on premium in post-reform years do not signiﬁcantly differ from those
employees who were covered under a health plan that did not charge add-on premiums.
The results for Part A are in Table 3.13 AddOnpostreform indicates how the switching
probability changed because of the charging of an add-on premium in post-reform years.
13The results are robust to using sample weights and weighted regressions.
19The ﬁrst column excludes any additional socio-economic control variables and yields a
highly signiﬁcant add-on premium effect of +0.061 percentage points. It is basically the
regression part equivalent to what we see in Figure 1. Related to the 4 percent average
baseline switching probability for the treatment group (see Appendix A2), this translates
into a add-on premium-related increase in the switching probability by 150 percent. The
baseline probability to switch more than doubled for insurees who were charged add-on
premiums. This effect is very robust to the inclusion of additional covariates as column (2)
demonstrates.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Column (3) includes Reimbpostreform. Reimbpostreform is one for post-reform years
and individuals who were reimbursed parts of their premium. Remember that these indi-
viduals have no extraordinary right to cancel the contract and are bound to their 18 months
enrollment period. Moreover, since here the unit of observation is the individual, we do
not observe an increase in plan enrollment. Most importantly, as discussed in Section 4.2.2
and can be inferred from Table 2, the phenomenon of premia reimbursement is quantita-
tively negligible. In our data, we only observe about 30 individuals per year who have a
one for their Reimb-Variable. Consequently, it is not surprising that the estimate for Reimb
shows large standard errors, almost twice as large as the point estimate, and are not at all
useful. Therefore, in Part B below, we exclusively focus on the much more relevant effect of
premium increases on health plan switching.
Column (4) of Table 3 tests whether the results depend on the inclusion of the years 2008
and 2009 that do not show parallel trends. We do not ﬁnd evidence for this since excluding
these two years from our data yields a highly signiﬁcant 6.0 percentage point increase that
is almost identical to out baseline estimate in column (1). Column (5) checks whether the
results are sensitive to functional form assumptions and runs an OLS model. The estimated
add-on premium effect is slightly, but not dramatically, larger than the baseline estimate in
column (1). It is highly signiﬁcant.
4.3 Part B: Assessing the Price Effect of Premium Increases on Switching
Behavior: Pre- and Post-Reform
4.3.1 Econometric Model
To assess the impact of premium increases and the change in the framing of premium in-
creases on the switching probability, we estimate the following probit model:
20Prob[Switchit = 1] = F(b0 + b1PremiumIncreaseit  prereformt (2)
+ b2PremiumIncreaseit  postreformt
+ gXit + ft + sfs + eit)
where Switchit, Xit, ft, sfs, est, and F(.) are deﬁned as above. The variable prereformt takes
on the value one in years before the reform and zero afterwards, while the opposite holds
for postreformt.14 Here, PremiumIncreaseit stands representative for three different price
regressors that we subsequently employ, depending on the model speciﬁcation:
(i) A dummy variable that identiﬁes individuals whose health plan premiums increased between
t   1 and t (PremiumIncreaseDummy).
(ii) A variable that measures the premium increase in Euro between t   1 and t (PremiumIn-
creaseEuro).
(iii) A variable that measures the premium increase in percent between t   1 and t, relative to the
premium in t   1. (PremiumIncreasePercent)
PremiumIncreaseEuro andPremiumIncreasePercent alwaysrefertoincreasesinthemonthly
“out-of-pocket” health insurance premium, i.e., changes in the employee share of the pre-
mium. For example, employing PremiumIncreaseEuro prereform as regressor of interest
allows us to calculate the effect of an increase in the monthly health plan premium by e1
expressed in relative terms (also labeled [relative] in the regression tables). To measure
the effect due to an increase expressed in absolute terms, we use PremiumIncreaseEuro
postreform (also labeled [absolute]).
In Part B of the analysis we focus solely on the health plan switching effects that are trig-
gered by increases in health plan premiums for the following reasons: First, we would like
to stress the outstanding importance of health plan premium increases, both for researchers
and policymakers. Almost all industrialized countries have seen staggering increases health
care expenditures and health care premiums. In Germany, the average contribution rate in-
creased from 12.6 percent in 1990 to 15.5 percent in 2011 (German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce,
2011). In the US, despite a substantial increase in cost-sharing, monthly “out-of-pocket”
health plan premiums for single coverage more than doubled from $27 in 1999 to $75 in
2010 (The Kaiser Family Foundation, 2011). Existing studies for Germany project signiﬁcant
future increases in health care expenditures and, hence, health plan premiums mainly due to
rising incomes, population aging, advances in medical technology, and system inefﬁciencies
(cf. Postler (2003)).
14This speciﬁcation yields exactly the same results as including PremiumIncreaseit and PremiumIncreaseit 
postreformt as the ﬁrst two regressors but facilitates the interpretation of the regression results later.
21A second reason goes back to the institutional setup, since insurees only have an extraor-
dinary right to cancel health insurance contracts and switch health plans immediately in
case of premium increases.
A ﬁnal reason to focus on premium increases is the empirical irrelevance of premium de-
creases. For the whole of Germany, enrollees in health plans with premium reimbursement
currently account only 0.63 percent of all PHI enrollees. Consequently, in post-reform years,
in the SOEP data, we only observe about 30 respondents who saw premium decreases—far
too few to obtain precise estimates as we see in the results section for Part A below.
4.3.2 Identiﬁcation of Causal Effects and Results
Identiﬁcation of Causal Effects
In the empirical models illustrated by equation 2, our core source of identifying variation is
the health plan premium variation across the 41 sickness funds over more than 10 years. As
discussed in Section 3.2, health plan premiums are autonomously set at the health plan level
by the sickness funds. The largest German health plans have a market share of about 10
percent and 10 million enrollees. Hence, it is plausible to assume that health plan premium
changes on the health plan level are strictly exogenous to the individual. In Part B, our
identifyingvariationcomesfrom41(sicknessfunds)  11,813differentindividualsobserved
over various years. However, not every individual experienced premium increases in every
year.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
This is illustrated in Table 4. For example, in 2002, 79.95 percent of the 4,379 individuals
in our sample faced an average increase in their monthly health plan premiums by e4.72
(e56.64 per year) or 4.7 percent. Table 4 illustrates that premium increases occur in an-
nual waves due to health care cost shocks triggered by consumption or provider reimburse-
ment. There is a lot of variation in the share of respondents who were affected by premium
increases. However, the bandwidth of the average premium increase is quite small and
ranges between 1.7 and 5.3 percent of the individuals’ income. The most important thing
to remember is that the premium variation across health plans and years is exogenous from
the perspective of the individual, and it unambiguously and comprehensively affects every
individual identiﬁed in our data.
A crucial issue in most studies trying to evaluate policy reforms is selection into or out
of the policy intervention. We are in the fortunate position to exploit a unique institutional
setting that addresses selection issues quite convincingly. The reason is that compulsorily
insured sickness fund members must be insured under the PHI system. We can identify
the small fraction of voluntarily insured PHI members and exclude them in the robustness
22checks. This is the only group that could have opted-out of PHI in response to the reform.
However, opting-out of the PHI system is essentially a lifetime decision.
Keep in mind that sickness funds had almost no possibility to respond to the reform. Im-
portant PHI health plan parameters such as the beneﬁt package, the cost-sharing amount,
and provider reimbursement rates are centrally determined and are not only out of the indi-
viduals’ inﬂuence, but also out the sickness funds’ inﬂuence. The reform that we study was
implemented at the federal level, fully enforced, and applied to all 150 PHI sickness funds
in Germany.
It may have been that those sickness funds which decided to charge add-on premiums
took special (marketing) measures to keep their members. For example, they could have
stressed other than price factors to convince their members not to switch. Such “soft” fac-
tors might be service quality, the network of branch ofﬁces, or customer loyalty. Moreover,
although switching is in principle relatively easy, switching costs occur (see discussion in
Section 3.2.2). We found no evidence of a systematic anti-switching campaign. We would
underestimate the price effects on switching behavior if that was nevertheless the case.
Switching health plans in the German PHI does not entail switching of primary care
physicians, specialists, or hospitals. There is no selective contracting in the German health
care system, meaning that all insured are free to enter any German hospital and to see any
doctor they want to see. In a nutshell, the provider network does not change when indi-
viduals switch health insurances, which implies lower switching costs as compared to other
countries such as the US.
Baseline Results
Table 5 presents our baseline results and reads as follows: Each column represents one re-
gression model as in equation (2). In the ﬁrst row, we make use of dummies that indi-
cate whether an insuree would carry a premium increase between t0 and t1 if they did not
switch health plans. PremiumIncreaseDummyprereform indicates the average marginal
effect for pre-reform years, i.e., from 2000-2009, when prices were expressed in percentage
point payroll differences. We see that in pre-reform years, the baseline probability to switch
health plans increased by 1.8 percentage points from 5.6 percent (Appendix A1) in case of an
average premium increase. However, as displayed in the second row – PremiumIncrease-
Dummypostreform – in post-reform years, when the framing of price differences was
exogenously changed to absolute Euro values, the switching probability doubled after a
premium increase. Both effects are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Column (2) is built on the same principle. However, now we make use of the more precise
measure PremiumIncreaseEuro, which represents monthly premium increases in e100. In
23pre-reform years, a monthly premium increase by e10 increased the switching probability
by 0.9 percentage points from 5.6to 6.5 percent, or by 16 percent. The legislative requirement
to express price differences in absolute Euro values rather than percentage point payroll tax
differences boosted that probability to a staggering 150 percent, by the factor 6 and more
than doubled that baseline probability to switch. Note that this ﬁnding is in line with the
ﬁnding from Table 3.
Finally, in column (3), we ﬁnd that a premium increase of 10 percent increased the base-
line switching probability from 5.6 to 7 percent, or 25 percent, in pre-reform years. This
translates into a pre-reform switching elasticity of 2.5: a premium increase by 1 percent in-
creased the individual-level switching probability by 2.5 percent. Simple regulatory effort
that changed the price framing of premium differences across health plans more than dou-
bled the baseline switching probability from 5.6 to 13.6 percent as a reaction to a 10 percent
premium increase. The implied switching elasticity shoot by the factor 6 from 2.5 to 14. All
regressors of interest in Table 5 are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.
Robustness Checks
Robustness checks for our preferred speciﬁcation (PremiumIncreaseEuro) are shown in Ta-
ble 6. In column (1) we restrict the sample to those PHI members that are compulsorily
insured within the public health insurance system. In other words, we identify and exclude
the subsample that could have selected themselves out of the treatment and opted-out of the
public system in reaction to the reform. We observe that both point estimates, for the pre-
and post-reform price sensitivity, are signiﬁcant and fall into the same conﬁdence intervals
as the baseline estimates in column (2) of Table 5.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
In column (2), we only consider the years 2007 to 2010. This exercise also provides evidence
whether serial correlation in case of long time horizons is a threat to our estimates because of
underestimated standard errors. The size, sign, and signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients are fully
in line with our baseline estimates. Column (3) also tests whether the potential underesti-
mation of standard errors is a threat to our results. It clusters standard errors at the health
planyear level (4111=451 cluster).
In column (4), we exclude the pre-reform years 2008 and 2009. The pre-reform price sen-
sitivity is larger once we exclude the pre-reform years 2008 and 2009. Now a monthly pre-
mium increase by e10 would increase the switching probability by two percentage points.
This might be a hint to uncertainty in the two years before the reform became effective. The
price effect in 2008 and 2009 was very low since, due to increased uncertainty, insurees did
not switch until the reform fully phased in in 2010.
24Characterization of Health Plan Switchers
Although the main objective of this paper is to estimate price (framing) effects on health
plan switching, it is worth looking at the signiﬁcant socio-economic correlates of switchers
in Table 7. In doing so we employ an extended set of covariates in the analysis. Since some of
these are only available as of 2002, this analysis is based on a smaller sample of only 36,111
observations. We basically drop the years 1999-2001 but still have plenty of pre-reform years
left.
In line with earlier studies, we see that older people are less likely to switch, which
could suggest that the length of plan enrollment is an important determinant of switching
behavior. We already discussed potential explanations for this ﬁnding, such as brand loyalty
and the status-quo hypothesis. Besides decision overload, one of the main barriers to health
plan switching is certainly switching costs. Cancellation notice has to be given in written
form and employees need to sign-up for a new health plan. The internet facilitates switching
substantially, but older people are still especially reluctant to use the internet.
Looking at labor market characteristics, we ﬁnd evidence that being full-time employed,
having a higher income and, again surprisingly, being less well educated is positively corre-
lated with the switching probability.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Finally, the lower bottom panel of Table 7 makes use of rich socio-economic background
information from the SOEP. We replicate the well-established ﬁnding that healthier peo-
ple are more likely to switch. Controlling for severall health measures jointly, subjective
self-assessed health (SAH) does not seem to have a signiﬁcant effect. However, we ﬁnd sig-
niﬁcant correlations with the degree of disability and the number of outpatient doctor visits.
Also, we ﬁnd that mentally healthy people are more likely to switch but ﬁnd no such rela-
tionship for physically strong people. Obese people and smokers are less likely to switch.
Who Reacts Strongest to a Change in Price Framing?
Now we would like to know: How can we characterize the people who react to premium
increases and whose price elasticity exactly increased due to the change in price framing?
The answer is given by Table 8. The setup of Table 8 is similar to the one of Table 6. Each
column represents one probit regression model similar to the one in equation 2. The only
difference is that we interact the covariates as indicated in the column header additionally
with the regressors of interest in order to analyze reform heterogeneity.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
25In column (1) we are interested in the stratifying covariate age 41-64, which is a dummy and
splits the sample in to people younger than 41 and older than 41.15 The ﬁrst two rows in-
dicate how middle-age insurees reacted to price changes pre-reform. The price effect can be
directly compared to the effect in the second row where we interact PremiumIncreaseEuro
with [1-(age 41-64)]. The next two rows do exactly the same but for post-reform years.
The ﬁndings show that only the younger generation was price responsive in strict statistical
terms, both pre- and post-reform.
In column (2), we stratify the sample by the median household income. A price in-
crease of e10 per month weighs more for the poorer half of the sample—both relative to
their income and relative to their baseline premium, which is also lower due to the income-
dependence of the premiums (see Section 3.1). Moreover, lower income classes have lower
(monetary) opportunity costs and thus lower switching costs. Consequently, it might now
be surprising that the price sensitivity of the poorer half was already, pre-reform, much
higher than the price sensitivity of the richer half of the sample. The implied price elastici-
ties were 4.2 vs. 2.8. Pre-reform, a 1 percent price increase increased switching probabilities
for the poor by 4.2 percent; but for the rich only by 2.8 percent. The poorer half also beneﬁted
the most from the change in price framing and the higher price transparency. They heav-
ily reacted and switched health plans more often when price differences were visualized in
absolute Euro values.
Column (3) shows that the price effects for the risk-loving are higher than for the risk-
averse. The same holds for those in better physical and mental health shape (columns (4)
and (5)). Although all of the point estimates for smokers vs. non-smokers are statistically
signiﬁcant we cannot say that smokers react differently to price changes than non-smokers
since the conﬁdence intervals overlap. Further, obesity does not seem to be a driving force.
5 Evidence From Aggregate Health Plan Level Panel Data
This section provides complementary empirical evidence on the price framing effect, sup-
porting our main empirical analysis in Section 4. Although the data that we rely on is—in
contrast to SOEP data—not representative, has few observations, and the results and ﬁnd-
ings of this exercise can only be generalized to the universe of the ﬁve health plans that we
look at, it has two main advantages. First, we make use of aggregated sickness fund panel
data. By law, sickness funds are obliged to accurately measure their number of enrollees
and members and provide the German Ministry of Health (Bundesministerium f¨ ur Gesund-
heit, BMG) with these data at regular time intervals. Second, we able able to evaluate the
15Note that, since retirees are excluded, elderly in this sample are up to 64 years old.
26price framing effects from a different perspective. In Section 4, we took an individual-level
perspective. Here, our unit of observation is the health plan and the net annual change of
health plan members. As such, we are able to compare our estimation results to a variety of
existing ﬁndings in the literature.
5.1 Sample Selection
The DAK and the KKH are the largest two sickness funds that charge add-on-premiums. In
2010, they had 4.5 (DAK) and 1.3 (KKH) million enrollees. We collected aggregated member-
ship data on the two other large German Ersatzkassen with a substantial market share: the
BARMER Ersatzkasse and the Techniker Krankenkasse (TK). In 2010, the BARMER sickness
fund had 5.3 million members (market share: 10.3 percent) and the TK had 4.6 million mem-
bers (market share: 8.9 percent). The BARMER and the TK are the largest German sickness
funds. We surveyed all annual reports of these four large German Ersatzkassen from 2002-
2010 and collected the average number of members for each fund and year. In addition, we
collected membership data for the largest sickness fund that reimbursed insurees. The hkk,
however, had on average only 130,000 members between 2002 and 2010 is thus relatively
small as compared to the other four sickness funds.
Thus, in total, we obtain aggregated data from 2002 to 2010 for ﬁve of the largest German
sickness funds. Two of these funds charged an add-on premium of e8 per month, one
fund reimbursed their members e5 per month, and two neither charged add-on premiums
nor reimbursed money. Together these ﬁve sickness funds represent more than 15 million
sickness fund members and have a nationwide health plan market share of more than 30
percent.16
The number of members varies between 0.12 and 5.6 million across funds and years. In
2008, the year before the contribution rates were equalized and frozen by the legislature, the
ﬁve funds charged contributions that varied between 14.1 and 15.4 percent. Related to the
average gross wage, these contribution rate differences translated into annual price differ-
ences for employees of up to e16.60 per month (e200 per year). Our identifying variation
in the aggregated data comes from health plan price differences across ﬁve funds  eight
years. Given the institutional setup and the size of the sickness funds—and thus health plan
members—health plan premiums in given years are plausibly exogenous from the perspec-
tive of the insured individual.
16In total, the ﬁve sickness funds represent more the 21 million enrollees, dependents insured under family
insurance included.
275.2 Model Speciﬁcation
We run the following models to assess the impact of price changes on changes in health
plan enrollment and health plan market shares. Moreover, as such, we can estimate “out-of-
pocket (semi-)elasticities” as well as “insurer-perspective (semi-)elasticities“ and compare
them with previous ﬁnding in the literature on demand elasticities (see Section 2 for more
details).
The ﬁrst model, run with aggregated data by means of OLS, is
DMs,t = b0 + b1PremiumRelativest + b2AddOnst  postreformt (3)
+ b3Reimbst  postreformt + b4NoChanges + ft + est
where DMs,t = Ms,t   Ms,t 1/Ms,t 1, depending on the model, measures either
(i) the change in members of sickness fund s between t0 and t1 in percent, or
(ii) the change in the market share of sickness fund s between t0 and t1 in percent.
PremiumRelativest standsforthesicknessfundspeciﬁcpayrolltaxrate(“contributionsrate”)
of sickness fund s at time t. This variable can also be interpreted as the “full” (or “insurer-
perspective”) health insurance premium since it includes employee and employer shares.
It measures the pre-reform price effect of health plan premiums on membership and mar-
ket share changes. The AddOnpostreform-dummy measures the effect of the “out-of-
pocket”-add-on premium on health plan enrollment and market share development. It
has a one for the two add-on premium charging funds in post-reform years. In contrast,
Reimbpostreform is one for the reimbursing fund in post-reform years. NoChanges has a
one for the two remaining funds that did neither charge add-on premiums nor reimbursed
their members. ft is a vector that includes year dummies and est is the error term.
The second model that we run is
DMs,t = b0 + b1PremiumEurost + b2PremiumEurost  postreformt (4)
+ b3NoChanges + ft + est
28where DMs,t, NoChanges, ft, and est aredeﬁnedasabove. Themaindifferencewithequation
(3) is that we calculate the employees’ health plan premiums in Euro for every sickness fund
s at time t (PremiumEurost) by multiplying half of the contribution rate with the average
employee gross wage (see Section 3.2 for more details). This variable can also be interpreted
as the “out-of-pocket” health insurance premium. b1 measures the pre-reform effect of an
annual increase in premiums by e100 and b1 + b2 the post-reform effect.
The summary statistic for the aggregated data is presented in Appendix B. On aver-
age over all years, the ﬁve funds had 3.1 million members but lost 0.2 percent of them per
year. On average, they charged a contribution rate of 14.58 percent. The employee share of
this income-dependent health plan premium amounted to an average of e2,355 per year or
e196.25 per month (in 2009 values). The average market share over all funds and years was
6.1 percent, which decreased, however, by an annual rate of 0.1 percent.
5.3 Results
Table 9 provides the estimation results from the aggregated sickness fund panel data and the
regressionmodelsasdiscussedabove. Theﬁrsttwocolumnsusethechangeinsicknessfund
members as dependent variable. An increase in the sickness fund-speciﬁc payroll tax rate
(“contribution rate”= PremiumRelative) by 1 percentage point led on average to a decrease
in health plan enrollment by 4.1 percent. This estimate is in line with Schut et al. (2003), who
usesimilardata, butanearliertimeperiod, fortheuniverse of allGermanhealthplans. They
estimate the membership elasticity with respect to contribution rates to be -4.8. A health
plan price increase by 1 percentage point of the contribution rate represents an absolute
price increase by about e300 per year. Applied to the average full annual premium over
all years—e4,500—this translates into a price increase by 6.67 percent. Hence, the implied
full—or “insurer-perspective”—demand elasticity with respect to health plan enrollment is
-0.6.
Now consider column (2), where the variable PremiumEuro indicates that a e100 an-
nual out-of-pocket health plan premium increase leads to a decrease in plan enrollment by
2.6 percent. Related to the average annual out-of-pocket premium (see Appendix B), e100
represent a price increase by 4.2 percent.17 This ﬁnding that a 1 percent price increase in
out-of-pocket insurance premiums decreases plan enrollment by 0.6 percent is— despite
all institutional differences—perfectly in line with the US studies (Cutler and Reber, 1998;
Buchmueller, 2006).
17Note that in the German institutional setting, the “out-of-pocket” demand elasticity is identical to the
“insurer-perspective” demand elasticity (see Section 2), since employees pay 50 percent of the full premium
and, hence, carry 50 percent of any price change.
29[Insert Table 9 about here]
Before turning to the effect of the change in price framing, we look at the price effect on
the change in market shares, as indicated in columns (3) and (4) of Table 9. The results are
almost identical to the ones presented in columns (1) and (2): A e100 annual out-of-pocket
premium increase decreases a sickness fund’s—and hence health plan’s—market share by
2.6 percent; this demand semi-elasticity is a little bit lower than the estimates from the US
(see Section 2). However, the majority of these studies are structural in nature, deﬁne market
shares more narrowly18, and focus on speciﬁc population subsamples (Dowd and Feldman,
1994; Bundorf et al., 2008; Einav et al., 2010; Lustig, 2011; Starc, 2011; Abaluck and Gruber,
2011). The implied demand elasticity with respect to the market share is identical to the
one derived from columns (1) and (2) and is -0.6. It is sightly larger, but in line with, those
obtained by Schut and Hassink (2002); Carlin and Town (2009) as well as Handel (2011).
Now we come to the core theme of this paper and look at whether, and if so, how, the
exogenous change in the framing of price differences across health plans affected consumer
price sensitivity. The second row of Table 9 indicates whether the introduction of add-on-
premiums triggered a signiﬁcant increase in health plan price sensitivity. The dummy vari-
able AddOnpostreform identiﬁes those sickness funds with add-on premiums in post-
reform years, i.e., for DAK and KKH in 2010. As inferred from columns (1) and (3), the
introduction of such an add-on premium led to decreasing numbers of members and de-
creasing market share, falling to 6.5 percent. This translates into an elasticity of -1.8, which
is three times as large as the -0.6 pre-reform elasticity derived from row (1).
The dummy variable Reimbpostreform yields the effect of a post-reform reimburse-
ment of e5 per month on enrollment and market share and is +2.3 percent. Interestingly,
the implied elasticity is only half as large as for the premium-increase case and -0.9. This
ﬁnding is in line with prospect theory and the concept of loss aversion (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979).19
Returning to columns (2) and (4) of Table 9. The pre-reform effects of an annual increase
in out-of-pocket premiums by e100 have already been discussed. Adding the coefﬁcients
for PremiumEuro and PremiumEuropostreform gives us the post-reform effect of an out-
of-pocket premium increase by e100 on plan enrollment and plan market share. We ﬁnd an
effect of -6.9 percent, translating into an demand price elasticity of -1.6, which is consistent
with the ﬁnding above. Again, as compared to the -0.6 demand elasticity that we ﬁnd for
18Note that in this setting, the market share is deﬁned as health plan enrollment as a share of the (German)
universe of health plan enrollment.
19z An alternative explanation refers to the institutional setting and the fact that premium increases trigger
an extraordinary right to cancel the contract and switch health plan, whereas this is not the case for premium
decreases (see Section 3).
30pre-reform years, this represents a reform-induced increase in consumer price sensitivity by
almost the factor 3.
We summarize the following from our models using aggregated data: (i) all ﬁndings are
plausible and in line with the diverse literature on this topic; (ii) the price elasticity for ab-
solute premium increases is twice as large as the elasticity for absolute premium decreases;
and, most importantly, (iii) the policy reform that exogenously changed the price framing
for price differences across health plans increased the out-of-pocket demand price elasticity
by the factor 3 to -1.6.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence from a natural experiment showing how price fram-
ing affects consumer health plan choice. We rely on a unique institutional setting in which
150 health plans predominately compete on price levels and in which health plan coverage,
cost-sharing, and provider reimbursement are ﬁxed at the federal level. Germany’s pub-
lic health insurance system offers a free choice of providers and, thus, has no health plan
speciﬁc provider networks.
Thereformstudiedregulateshowhealthplanpricesaredisplayed. Policymakerswanted
to make price differences between health plans more transparent and express them more
clearly to customers in order to foster competition between insurance companies. Before
the reform, health plan prices were expressed in form of a mandatory payroll tax rate. Each
of the 150 health plans set their payroll tax rate autonomously and independently. In other
words: price differences between health plans were expressed in percentage point payroll
tax rate differences. Health plans were basically identical, employees were allowed to freely
choose their health plan, and the pre-reform maximum price differences amounted up to
e60 per month. Nevertheless, switching rates were fairly low. At that time, a monthly
“out-of-pocket” premium increase by e10 increase the baseline switching probability by 0.9
percentage points or 16 percent.
A simple federal reform equalized and froze the health plan payroll tax rate across all
health plans. The law required health insurers to report the difference to this standardized
federal-level health plan price in absolute Euro values. Using rich individual-level SOEP
panel data covering more than 10 years, we show that changing the framing of price dif-
ferences to absolute Euro values boosted the increase in the switching probability triggered
by a premium increase by a factor of 6. It doubled the baseline probability to switch health
plans.
31We complement this individual-level panel data analysis, which is representative for 80
percent of the German population, with aggregated data from ﬁve of the largest German
health plans. The ﬁve health plans have a collective market share of 30 percent. While we
take the individual-level perspective when using SOEP panel data, in this case we take the
health plan perspective. The pre-reform demand elasticity was about -0.6, i.e., an increase
in health plan premiums by 1 percent decreased health plan enrollment and health plan
market shares by about 0.6 percent. Changing the framing of price differences across health
plans increased this elasticity almost by the factor 3 to -1.6.
A simple back-of-the envelope calculation illustrates the reform-associated increase in
consumer welfare: The reform made price labeling more transparent and, thus, doubled the
switching rates among those 10 million Germans who now pay more than that standard
price as set by the legislature. Under the assumption that switchers save on average e10
per month, this translates into savings of e5 million per month for this group. To the extent
that individuals switch to more efﬁcient sickness funds, these savings could be interpreted
as efﬁciency gains that directly increase gross consumer welfare. In the future, due to rising
health expenditures, more health plans will charge add-on premiums, competition will fur-
ther intensify, and more consumers will switch health plans. Under the assumption that the
total population switching rate would double to 10 percent, and individuals switch to plans
who work more efﬁciently, consumer savings would increase to e300 million annually.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper providing non-experimental evidence
on how ﬁndings from behavioral economics translate to real world consumer health plan
choice. It also illustrates how insights from behavioral economics can be used to improve
the design of health care markets. Our ﬁndings are of general importance and certainly not
speciﬁc to Germany. Experiments show that non-rational behavioral phenomena are not
country-speciﬁc. Applied to other countries, the results of this study would suggest that,
whenever possible, health plan prices should be expressed in absolute monetary values.
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37Table 1: Selected Sickness Funds (=Health Plans) and Maximum Price Differences: 2008








City BKK 17.4% e233.51 207,000 0.29% 15/16 federal states
AOK Saarland 16.7% e224.58 230,000 0.23% 1/16 federal state
AOK Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 16.7% e224.58 487,995 0.69% 1/16 federal state
AOK Berlin 16.7% e224.58 712,000 1.01% 1/16 federal state
Joint BKK Cologne 16.6% e223.30 40,000 0.06% 16/16 federal states
BKK BMV 16.6% e223.30 70,657 0.10% 16/16 federal states
... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ...
BIG direct healthy 13.4% e182.47 338,000 0.48% 16/16 federal states
BKK of the Thuringia Energy Supply 13.3% e181.19 12,100 0.02% 2/16 federal states
IKK Thuringia 13.2% e179.92 230,000 0.33% 3/16 federal states
IKK South-West Direct 13.2% e179.92 500,000 0.71% 3/16 federal states
BKK MEM 13.1% e178.64 2,100 0.00% 1/16 federal states
IKK Saxony 12.7% e173.54 690,000 0.98% 3/16 federal states
Sources: National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds, Annual Reports of the Sickness Funds, information by sickness funds. The
employee “out-of-pocket”- premium (column 2) is calculated according to the average monthly gross wage in 2008, which was e2,552 (German
Statutory Pension Insurance, 2011). Column (3) displays the number of enrollees, i.e., the family members insured under PHI family insurance
are included. Column (4) divides the total number of enrollees in a speciﬁc sickness fund (column (3)) by the total number of PHI insured in
Germany in 2008, which was 70,244 million (German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 2011). Column (5) shows that not all plans operate nationwide.
The City BKK was the ﬁrst German sickness fund in history to go bankrupt and was closed on July 1, 2011. AOK Mecklenburg-West Pomerania
and AOK Berlin merged to the new AOK North-East on January 1, 2011. Joint BKK Cologne merged with the bhplus BKK on January 1, 2011.
BKK BMV merged with the Schwenninger BKK on January 1, 2009. IKK Thuringia and IKK Sachsen merged, forming IKK Classic on January
1, 2010.
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8Table 2: Overview of Sickness Funds With Add-On Premiums And Reimbursement
Name of Sickness Fund Monthly Amount
/Month






A: Funds with Add-On Premium
BKK Hoesch e15.00 01/01/2011 - 99,415 0.14% 15.80% 10/16 federal states
City BKK e15.00 04/01/2010 07/01/2010 168,000 0.24% 17.40% 16/16 federal state
BKK of the Healing Professions e10.00 01/01/2011 - 185,000 0.26% 16.20% 16/16 federal state
BKK Westphalian-Lippe e12.00 02/01/2010 09/30/2010 27,355 0.04% 15.70% 16/16 federal state
DAK e8.00 02/01/2010 03/31/2012 6,049,941 8.64% 15.40% 16/16 federal states
KKH-Allianz e8.00 03/01/2010 03/01/2012 1,900,057 2.71% 14.80% 16/16 federal states
German BKK e8.00 02/01/2010 - 916,765 1.31% 15.10% 16/16 federal states
BKK Health e8.00 02/01/2010 03/31/2012 1,200,000 1.71% 14.90% 6/16 federal states
BKK Phoenix e8.00 01/01/2010 - 10,663 0.02% 16.30% 16/16 federal states
Novitas BKK e8.00 07/01/2010 12/31/2010 450,000 0.64% 15.40% 16/16 federal states
Esso BKK e8.00 04/01/2010 12/31/2010 26,000 0.04% 14.50% 16/16 federal states
BKK Publik e8.00 01/01/2011 - 6,849 0.01% 15.50% 3/16 federal states
BKK Axel Springer e8.00 01/01/2010 03/31/2012 12,142 0.02% 16.50% only Axel Springer employees
BKK Merck e8.00 04/01/2010 - 28,000 0.04% 14.30% only Merck employees
e.on BKK e8.00 03/01/2010 06/30/2011 8,900 0.01% 14.50% only e.on employees
BKK advita e6.50 07/01/2011 - 43,000 0.06% 15.70% 16/16 federal states
Joint BKK Cologne 1% of wage 09/01/2009 12/31/2010 29,414 0.04% 16.60% 16/16 federal states
Total 11,161,501 15.93%
Total 12/2011 10,451,832 14.92%
B: Funds with Reimbursement
BKK A.T.U. e2.50 01/01/2011 - 100,223 0.14% 14.40% 16/16 federal states
hkk e5.00 01/01/2009 - 325,511 0.46% 14.10% 16/16 federal states
BKK Economics and Finance e5.00 01/01/2011 - 10,000 0.01% 14.40% 12/16 federal states
BKK PWC e5.00 01/01/2011 - 17,091 0.02% 14.10% only PWC employees
BKK ALP Plus e5.83 07/01/2009 03/30/2010 107,773 0.15% 14.80% 16/16 federal states
G+V BKK e6.00 10/01/2009 - 1,000 0.00% 12.20% 2/16 federal states
IKK South-West e8.33 01/01/2009 01/01/2010 680,000 0.97% 13.80% 3/16 federal states
BKK Groz-Beckert e8.33 01/01/2009 - 6,280 0.01% 13.10% only Groz-Beckert employees
BKK W¨ urth e10.00 01/01/2009 - 12,432 0.01% 13.50% only Adolf W¨ urth employees
Total 1,260,310 1.77%
Total 12/2011 472,537 0.63%
Sources: German Federal (Social) Insurance Ofﬁce, National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds, Annual Reports of the Sickness Funds, information by sickness funds. We can
identify and accurately assign SOEP respondents to the sickness funds listed in bold. Column (4) displays the number of enrollees, i.e., the family members insured under PHI family insurance
are included. Column (5) divides the total number of enrollees in a speciﬁc sickness fund (column (3)) by the total number of PHI insured in Germany in 2010, which was 70,011 million (German
Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, 2011). Column (6) shows that not all plans operate nationwide. The City BKK was the ﬁrst German sickness fund in history that went bankrupt and was closed on July
1, 2011. The BKK of the Healing Professions closes January 1, 2012. The DAK, BKK Health, and BKK Axel-Springer merges January 1, 2012, and will constitute the new DAK-Gesundheit. BKK
Westphalian-Lippe merged on October 1, 2010 with BKK Local. The Joint BKK Cologne merged on January 1, 2011 with the mhplus BKK. The exact reimbursement amount of the BKK W¨ urth
has not been determined yet.
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9Table 3: Add-on and Reimbursement Effect on Switching Behavior
Baseline Full set of With Without 2008 OLS
covariates reimb. and 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AddOnpostreform 0.061*** 0.064*** 0.067*** 0.060*** 0.080***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Reimbpostreform 0.016
(0.025)
Socio-economic controls no yes yes yes yes
Federal state dummies no yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Add-on dummy yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 51,291 51,291 51,257 41,938 51,291
p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01; standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Each
column represents one type of difference-in-differences model as illustrated by equation 1. The dependent
variable in all columns is Switchit and indicates whether individual i switched health plans between t   1 and
t. AddOnit is one for respondents whose sickness funds charged an add-on premium in post-reform years and
zero else. Reimbit is one for respondents whose sickness funds reimbursed premiums in post-reform years and
zero else. Each model, except for column (5), is a probit model. The “treatment”-effects of the probit models
are calculated according to Puhani (2011). Column (1) is the baseline estimate and the regression version of
Figure 1. Column (2) includes the full set of covariates (see Appendix A1). Column (3) additionally measures
the effect of reimbursement of health plan switching. Column (4) excludes the years 2008 and 2009. Column
(5) runs an OLS model.
Table 4: Premium Increase Effect on Switching Probability: Identifying Variation






increase in % of income
2000 3,257 0.03 1.65 2.10
2001 5,016 10.21 3.65 4.00
2002 4,379 79.95 4.72 4.67
2003 5,597 55.90 6.13 3.60
2004 5,169 0.00 - -
2005 4,767 0.50 2.70 1.69
2006 4,408 1.68 6.63 3.49
2007 4,851 90.02 9.55 5.32
2008 4,786 4.18 6.76 3.35
2009 4,567 88.81 8.33 4.91
2010 4,494 8.59 8.00 5.06







(divided by 100), [relative]
PremiumIncreaseEuropostreform 0.572 (0.131)
(divided by 100), [absolute]
PremiumIncreasePercentprereform 0.138 (0.045)
(divided by 100), [relative]
PremiumIncreasePercentpostreform 0.800 (0.177)
(divided by 100), [absolute]
Socio-economic controls yes yes yes
Federal state dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Observations 51,291 51,291 51,291
p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01; each model is a probit model, average marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the individual level. Each column represents one model as illustrated by equation 2. The dependent variable in all columns
is Switchit and indicates whether individual i switched health plans between t   1 and t. PremiumIncreaseDummy is a dummy variable
that identiﬁes individuals whose health plan premiums increased between t   1 and t. PremiumIncreasePercent is a continuous variable
that measures the premium increase between t   1 and t in percent, relative to the premium in t   1. More information on the covariates
is in Appendix A1.
41Table 6: Robustness checks
Only stat. Only 2007 cluster Without 2008
insured to 2010 health planyear and 2009
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PremiumIncreaseEuroprereform 0.103*** 0.064** 0.090 0.202***
(divided by 100), [relative] (0.030) (0.032) (0.068) (0.041)
PremiumIncreaseEuropostreform 0.601*** 0.542*** 0.572** 0.568***
(divided by 100), [absolute] (0.147) (0.126) (0.246) (0.130)
Socio-economic controls yes yes yes yes
Federal state dummies yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 42,584 18,698 51,291 41,938
p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01; each model is a probit model, average marginal effects are reported.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level, except for column (3). Each column repre-
sents one model as illustrated by equation 2. The dependent variable in all columns is Switchit and indicates
whether individual i switched health plans between t 1 and t. PremiumIncreaseEuro is a continuous variable
that measures the premium increase in Euro between t   1 and t. Column (1) excludes voluntarily insured.
Column (2) only includes the years 2007-2010. Column (3) clusters standard errors at the health planyear
(=1141) level. Column (4) excludes the years of 2008 and 2009.
42Table 7: Characterizing Health Plan Switchers
Correlates of switching behavior
using rich set of covariates
PremiumIncreaseEuroprereform 0.077*** (0.027)
(divided by 100), [relative]
PremiumIncreaseEuropostreform 0.462*** (0.150)




Children under 16 -0.005* (0.003)
Female 0.012*** (0.003)
Risk loving 0.010*** (0.003)
Educational and Labor Market Characteristics
Education inadequate (0-4 yrs) -0.052*** (0.019)
Education general (10-14 yrs) -0.005 (0.005)
Education A-level (14-16 yrs) -0.016*** (0.005)
Education voc. training (15-18 yrs) -0.013*** (0.005)
Education higher (20 yrs) -0.013*** (0.004)
Full-time employed 0.028*** (0.009)
Individual income > mean 0.005* (0.003)
Health and Health Care Consumption
SAH very good -0.001 (0.005)
SAH good 0.002 (0.003)
Degree Disability -0.000** (0.000)
Doctor visits -0.001*** (0.000)
Hospital visits 0.001 (0.003)
Partly imputed
PCS > median -0.001 (0.003)





Federal state dummies yes
Observations 36,111
p < 0.1,  p < 0.05,  p < 0.01; each model is a probit model, average
marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
individual level.

















PremiumIncreaseEuroprereform[column header=1] 0.021 0.056* 0.090*** 0.087*** 0.057* 0.060 0.125***
(divided by 100), [relative] (0.035) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.065) (0.042)
PremiumIncreaseEuroprereform[column header=0] 0.119*** 0.107*** 0.061* 0.065* 0.104*** 0.080*** 0.054*
(divided by 100), [relative] (0.032) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.028) (0.029)
PremiumIncreaseEuropostreform[column header=1] 0.262 0.265 0.529*** 0.509** 0.552*** 0.370 0.511**
(divided by 100), [absolute] (0.234) (0.202) (0.203) (0.202) (0.204) (0.449) (0.250)
PremiumIncreaseEuropostreform[column header=0] 0.605*** 0.724*** 0.391* 0.411* 0.363* 0.474*** 0.438**
(divided by 100), [absolute] (0.193) (0.215) (0.213) (0.214) (0.211) (0.158) (0.181)
Extended set of socio-economic controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Federal state dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 36,111 36,111 36,111 36,111 36,111 36,111 36,111
p < 0.1, p < 0.05,p < 0.01; each model is a probit model, average marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. Each column represents one model
similar to the one illustrated by equation 2. The only difference to equation 2 is that the regressor of interest, as indicated in the rows, is additionally interacted with the covariate of interest, as indicated in the
column headers. As such, we test for effect heterogeneity. The dependent variable in all columns is Switchit and indicates whether individual i switched health plans between t 1 and t. PremiumIncreaseEuro
is a continuous variable that measures the premium increase in Euro between t   1 and t. Column (1) interacts the regressors of interest with a dummy variable that splits the sample into those between 18
and 40 years of age, and those between 41 and 64. Column (2) interacts the regressors of interest with a dummy variable that splits the sample at the median of the income distribution. Column (3) uses a
dummy variable that splits the sample at the median of the “degree of risk taking” distribution. Column (4) uses a dummy variable that splits the sample at the median of the pcs distribution and column (5)
uses mcs instead. Column (6) uses the obese and column (7) the smoker indicator as described in Appendix A1.
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4Table 9: Aggregated Administrative Data:
Premium and Reform Effects on Members and Market Share
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable:
Change in Members in % Change in Market Share in %











Year Dummies yes yes yes yes
NoChange yes yes yes yes
N 40 40 40 40
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; standard errors are clustered at the sickness fund level. Columns (1) and (3) rep-
resent a model as in equation 3 and columns (2) and (4) as in equation 4. All models are estimated by OLS. The
dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) measures the change in members of a given sickness fund s between
t0 and t1 in percent. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) measures the change in the nationwide
market share of a given sickness fund s—and, given the institutional setting, as such, at the same time the
change in the nationwide health plan market share (see Section 3)—between t0 and t1 in percent. Premium-
Relative yield the pre-reform price effect of a change in the mandatory payroll deduction (“contribution rate”)
by 1 percentage point. Since this represents the employer and employee health plan premium, it represents
also the full or “insurer-perspective” premium (see Section 2). Addon measures the reform effect of changing
the price framing and a subsequent e8 monthly increase in premiums, i.e., the effect of introducing an add-
on premium. Reimb measures the reform effect of changing the price framing and a subsequent decrease in
premiums, i.e., the effect of a e5 monthly premium reimbursement. PremiumEuro measures the pre-reform
employee “out-of-pocket” price effect of e100 per year, i.e., e8.30 per month. PremiumEuropostreform
measures the reform effect of changing the price framing and a subsequent annual e100 change in the out-of-
pocket premium.
Appendix A
45Table A1: Descriptive Statistics for Individual-Level SOEP Data
Variable Description Mean S.D. Min Max Obs.
Switch Switches health plan between t0 and t1 0.056 0.231 0 1 51,291
AddOn Member of health plan that introduces
add-on premium in 2010
0.060 0.237 0 1 51,291
Regressors of Interest
PremiumIncreaseDummy Premium increase btw. t0 and t1 0.317 0.465 0 1 51,291
PremiumIncreaseEuro Premium increase btw. t0 and t1 in e 2.31 4.55 0 50.59 51,291
PremiumIncreasePercent Premium increase btw.t0 and t1 in % 1.48 2.68 0 20.59 51,291
Demographics
Age Age in years 42.487 10.744 18 64 51,291
Married Married=1 0.651 0.477 0 1 51,291
Children under 16 Number of children under 16 0.376 0.484 0 1 51,291
Female Female=1 0.423 0.494 0 1 51,291
Ln equiv, hh-income Ln equivalized household income 7.341 0.409 1.753 10.801 51,291
Degree Risk-Taking Scale from 0-10 4.547 1.720 0 10 49,087
(partly imputed)
Educational and Labor Market Characteristics
Educ. inadequate ISCED-1997 classiﬁcation: 1 (inade-
quate, 0-4 yrs.)
0.012 0.109 0 1 51,291
Educ. general ISCED-1997 classiﬁcation: 2 (general
elementary, 10-14 yrs.)
0.093 0.291 0 1 51,291
Educ. A-level ISCED-1997 classiﬁcation: 4 (voca-
tional plus A-level, 14-16 yrs.)
0.064 0.244 0 1 51,291
Educ. voc. train. ISCED-1997 classiﬁcation: 5 (higher
vocational, 15-18 yrs.)
0.100 0.301 0 1 51,291
Educ. higher ISCED-1997 classiﬁcation: 6 (higher
education, 20 yrs.)
0.209 0.407 0 1 51,291
Full-time employed Full-time employed=1 0.826 0.379 0 1 51,291
Health and Health Care Consumption
SAH excellent Best category on 1-5 scale 0.097 0.296 0 1 51,291
SAH good Best two categories on 1-5 scale 0.478 0.500 0 1 51,291
Degree Disability Degree of disability in % 2.88 12.28 0 100 51,291
Doctor visits Number of doctor visits in previous
three months
1.9 3.2 0 90 51,291
Hospital visits Number of hospital stays in previous
year
0.100 0.428 0 22 51,291
Partly imputed
Obese BMI > 30 0.146 0.353 0 1 37,545
Overweight 25 < BMI < 30 0.522 0.500 0 1 37,545
Smoker Current smoker=1 0.364 0.481 0 1 50,382
PCS SF12 Physical Health Scale (0-100) 0.520 0.077 0.092 0.735 36,522
MCS SF12 Mental Health Scale (0-100) 0.502 0.087 0.053 0.778 36,522
46Table A2: SOEP Analysis Part A: Observable Characteristics of Individuals by Reform Status
Overall Add-On Premium No Add-On Premium Normalized
Charged Post-Reform Charged Post-Reform difference
Mean Mean Variance Mean Variance
Switch 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05
Treatment-group 0.06 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Demographics
Age 42.49 43.09 113.50 42.45 115.54 0.04
Married 0.65 0.63 0.23 0.65 0.23 0.03
Children under 16 0.38 0.33 0.22 0.38 0.24 0.07
Female 0.42 0.59 0.24 0.41 0.24 0.25
Degree Risk-Taking 4.55 4.46 2.86 4.55 2.97 0.04
Educational and Labor Market Characteristics
Educ. inadequate 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.08
Educ. general 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.10
Educ. A-level 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04
Educ. voc. train. 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.04
Educ. higher 0.21 0.22 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.01
Full-time employed 0.83 0.74 0.19 0.83 0.14 0.16
Ln equiv. hh-income 7.34 7.41 0.19 7.34 0.17 0.12
Health and Health Care Consumption
SAH very good 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.03
SAH good 0.48 0.46 0.25 0.48 0.25 0.02
Degree Disability 2.88 4.33 240.72 2.78 144.88 0.08
Obese 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.05
Overweight 0.52 0.49 0.25 0.52 0.25 0.05
Smoker 0.36 0.36 0.23 0.36 0.23 0.01
PCS 0.52 0.52 0.01 0.52 0.01 0.05
MCS 0.50 0.49 0.01 0.50 0.01 0.07
Doctor visits 1.90 2.08 9.51 1.89 10.21 0.04
Hospital visits 0.10 0.10 0.31 0.10 0.17 0.01
This table shows the covariate distribution separately for the two groups that we use in Part A of Section 5 in our DID
analysis. The last column shows the normalized difference which has been calculated according to Ds =





and ¯ so denoting average covariate values for the treatment and control group, respectively. s stands for the variance. As a
rule of thumb, a normalized difference exceeding 0.25 is likely to lead to sensitive results (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).
47Appendix B
Table B1: Descriptive Statistics for Aggregated Administrative Data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Sickness fund members 3.1073 2.0504 0.1219 5.6374 40
(in t, in million)
Change of sickness fund members -0.00206 0.03213 -0.06471 0.05449 40
(btw. t0 and t1 in %)
Market share 0.0613 0.0404 0.02409 0.11145 40
(in t, relative to total enrollment in Germany)
Change of market share -0.00101 0.0311 -0.06672 0.0566 40
(btw. t0 and t1 in %)
PremiumRelative 14.58 0.6292 13.05 15.4 40
(Contribution Rate = full health plan premium)
AddOn 0.05 0.2207 0 1 40
(=1 for funds with add-on premium in post-reform years)
Reimb 0.05 0.2207 0 1 40
(=1 for funds with reimbursement in post-reform years)
PremiumEuro 23.55 1.22 21.09 25.88 40
(= Annual out-of-Pocket Health Plan Premium in e100)
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